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  Due to payoff uncertainties combined with risk aversion and/or real options, farmers 
may demand a premium in order to adopt conservation tillage practices, over and above 
the compensation for the expected profit losses (if any). We propose a method of directly 
estimating the financial incentives for adopting conservation tillage and distinguishing 
between the expected payoff and the premium of adoption based on observed behavior. 
We find that the premium may play a significant role in farmers’ adoption decisions. 
Even for non-adopters, conservation tillage provides a higher payoff than does 
conventional tillage on average, as agronomists have argued. However, non-adopters do 
not use conservation tillage because the expected profit gain alone does not fully 
compensate them for the uncertainties. To induce additional adoption, subsidies could be 
used. We find that in Iowa on average, the mean subsidy needed is $2.40 per acre per 
year for corn and $3.50 per acre per year for soybeans. 
 




THE SUBSIDY FOR ADOPTING CONSERVATION TILLAGE:  
ESTIMATION FROM OBSERVED BEHAVIOR 
  Significant quantities of topsoil are lost annually due to erosion (USDA/NRCS). This 
fact was a primary motivation for the establishment of the Soil Conservation Service in 
1935, and for many years, government programs have been targeted at reducing erosion 
levels (Claassen et al.). McConnell’s important 1983 paper led to a clear understanding of 
the role of private (on-farm) versus external (off-farm) costs of soil erosion, and much of 
the literature in agricultural economics since then has focused on off-farm damages 
related to the runoff of nutrients, chemicals, and soils.  
  More recently, increased concerns about water quality degradation from nonpoint 
sources and the implementation of  Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) regulations has 
generated interest in a variety of policies for environmental improvements in agriculture 
and mechanisms to encourage the adoption of conservation practices such as low-tillage 
methods. Careful economic analysis of the efficiency of these policies requires an 
understanding of the costs of achieving gains in environmental quality due to the 
adoption of conservation practices. 
  Adopting conservation practices does not always lead to profit losses for farmers. In 
fact, even without any government subsidy, on average over 36 percent of U.S. farmers use 
conservation tillage, and in Iowa the percentage is even higher (CTIC). Nevertheless, to the 
extent that an individual farmer ignores the social benefits of conservation practices, the 
adoption rate is likely to be lower than socially optimal. Further, even when conservation 
practices can raise farmers’ expected profit, they may be reluctant to adopt because the 
practices may be riskier. Farmers may require a premium to adopt because they are risk 
averse and/or because adoption involves sunk investments (e.g., in human or physical 
capital) while other real options are available (Arrow and Fisher). If so, the farmer adopts 
only if the additional profit of conservation practices overcomes the premium. 2 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
  A large amount of literature has studied the incentives of farmers to adopt 
conservation practices and new technologies in general (Sunding and Zilberman provide 
a review). The incentives are found to depend qualitatively on soil quality, crops grown, 
and farmer characteristics such as age and education. In spite of the amount of literature, 
there exists little empirical evidence on the payments (or subsidies) that would be needed 
to induce farmers to adopt conservation practices (and new technologies in general). The 
reason for this omission is that most of the studies employ discrete choice methods, 
which allow coefficient estimates to be recovered only up to a multiplicative constant. 
Thus, though probabilities of adoption can be estimated, these estimates cannot be readily 
converted into dollar compensation levels.
1 
  This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we present a new 
modeling strategy that allows for full recovery of the structural coefficients and hence the 
ability to directly compute the subsidies needed for adoption. Pautsch et al. apply a 
simple version of this model to examine the potential for carbon sequestration in 
agricultural soils. Here, we apply a richer version of the model and fully investigate the 
effects of various farm and farmer characteristics on the size of the subsidy. Further, we 
decompose the subsidy into the profit loss (or gain) from adoption and the adoption 
premium due to uncertainties. Our results confirm the arguments of agronomists and 
extension agents that conservation tillage pays: on average farmers gain from adoption. 
However, the adoption premium may exceed the profit gain, and consequently farmers 
still may demand a subsidy in order to adopt. Finally, based on the estimated subsidies, 
we calculate the “supply curve” of conservation tillage for a sample of Iowa farmers and 
analyze the role of the subsidies in improving environmental performance and as a tool 
for income transfers to farmers. In Iowa, where the existing adoption rate of conservation 
tillage is already high (over 60 percent), we find that a significant part of the subsidy (or 
conservation payments) will be income transfers to existing and low-cost adopters. 
  One important previous effort to estimate the premium for conservation tillage 
adoption relies on stated preference methods (Cooper; Cooper and Keim) and provides a 
useful empirical comparison to our results. These works relied on contingent valuation 
surveys that elicit directly from farmers the per acre payments they would need to induce 
adoption. In this paper, we estimate the premium based on observed behavior, noting that The Subsidy for Adopting Conservation Tillage: Estimation from Observed Behavior / 3 
farmers who have already adopted conservation tillage must have received high enough 
additional returns from doing so to compensate for the presence of any increased risk or 
real options. 
  In the next section, we present the behavioral model and derive the econometric 
specification from it, specifically noting the innovation that allows recovery of the 
structural coefficients. In the third section, the data used for estimation are described, and 
in the following section, the model is applied to the data set. The size and distribution of 
the premium payments are further studied in the fifth section, followed by conclusions 
and additional discussion.  
 
The Adoption Model 
  We begin by briefly describing the theoretical justification for the existence of an 
adoption premium and why the premium relates directly to payoff uncertainties. Let  1 p  
be the expected annual net return from using conservation tillage,  0 p  be that from using 
conventional tillage, and 
2
1 s  and 
2
0 s  be the variances of the two returns. Consider first a 
simple case where every year farmers are free to change their farming practices between 
the two choices. If farmers are risk averse, standard utility theory indicates that they use 
conservation tillage if and only if 
22
111010 ()() RR psps -‡-  or 
22
101110 ()() RR ppss -‡-, 
where  1() R g  is the risk premium associated with each practice. Typically 
22
10 ss > , either 
because farmers have more experience with conventional till or because of the agronomic 
characteristics of the two practices. Then  1 p  must exceed  0 p  by a strictly positive 
premium for farmers to adopt conservation tillage. 
  More realistically, adopting a new tillage practice requires certain sunk investments 
in physical and human capital. Moreover, conservation tillage usually leads to lower 
yields in early years before soil nutrients build up. The lost profit in these years is sunk 
because it cannot be recovered by reverting back to conventional till. Given the 
uncertainties and the lost profits, farmers may be reluctant to adopt conservation till and 
will adopt only when they are especially “sure” that adoption will be profitable. 
Particularly, there is a value of delaying the adoption until the likelihood of unprofitable 4 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
adoption is sufficiently low. Then farmers adopt only when  1 p  exceeds  0 p  by the option 
value or premium 
22
210 (,) R ss , where  2() R g  is increasing in both arguments. This 
reasoning does not depend on the risk attitude of farmers and is a standard result in the 
real options literature (Arrow and Fisher; Dixit and Pindyck).  
  Note that both sources of the adoption premium (R1 and R2) depend on the existence 
of uncertainties in the returns of conventional and conservation tillage practices. For 
example, the existence of sunk costs of adopting alone does not generate a premium. If 
farmers know with certainty the future streams of returns under the two practices, their 
decision will depend only on the two net present values (NPVs). In this case, the sunk 
costs simply enter the streams of returns and affect the NPV alone; thus, they will not 
lead to any additional adoption premium. 
  In summary, due either to risk aversion or to real options, farmers typically demand a 
premium for adopting conservation tillage. That is, they adopt if and only if 
22
1010 (,) P ppss -‡ , where 
222222
101110210 (,)[()()](,) PRRR ssssss =-+ . The premium is 
zero when both variances are zero.  
  We turn now to the modeling strategy for describing farmers’ decisions to adopt 
conservation tillage. In the standard setting (Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe; Uri; Rahm and 
Huffman), farmers are predicted to adopt conservation tillage if the expected profit from 
adoption exceeds that from continuing with conventional practices, i.e., when  10 pp ‡ . 
Farmers’ profit functions are assumed to be known to the farmers but are unobservable to 
the researcher. An additive error is incorporated to reflect the researcher’s omission of 
relevant variables or misspecification of the net return functions. An expression for the 
probability of adoption from the researcher’s perspective can be then written as 
  [ ] [ ] 10 PrPr, adopt ppse =‡+   (1) 
wheree is typically a standard normal or logistic error and s is the associated standard 
deviation multiplier. We write the error term in this somewhat nonstandard way to more 
easily explain the limitation of this form of the model. The next step is to specify a 
functional form for the difference in the net returns, typically linear in explanatory The Subsidy for Adopting Conservation Tillage: Estimation from Observed Behavior / 5 
variables, e.g.,  10 pp -= dy , where y is a vector of explanatory variables and dis a vector 
of coefficients. 
  There are two limitations of this model for fully understanding adoption decisions. 
First, there is no explicit formalization of the existence of the premium needed to induce 
adoption. Second, and even more critical for estimating the financial incentives needed to 
induce adoption, the coefficients on the net return expression can only be estimated up to 
the multiplicative constant, s . To see this, write the probability of adoption as  
 












  (2) 
This formulation makes clear the point that is well known among practitioners of discrete 
choice models: only estimates of the ratios of the coefficients to the standard deviation 
can be recovered. Consequently, the changes in net returns associated with adoption of 
conservation tillage cannot be estimated. Analysts must be satisfied with predictions of 
qualitative changes such as identifying what characteristics of farmers will increase the 
likelihood of adoption.  
  Here we propose and implement a new conceptual model that both explicitly 
incorporates an adoption premium to reflect risk aversion and real options and allows 
recovery of an estimate of s , thereby allowing recovery of the individual parameter 
values. Specifically, we assume that an individual farmer will adopt conservation tillage 
when  10, P pp ‡+ where P is the premium. Again, an additive error is used to represent 
omitted variables or misrepresentation of the net return statement by the researcher, and 
1 p  is assumed linear in explanatory variables. However, we assume that the expected net 
returns from conventional tillage are known to the farmer and focus on modeling the 
returns to conservation tillage as a function of explanatory variables. Thus, we write the 
probability of adoption as 6 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
 




















  (3) 
where P(z) represents the premium as a function of its explanatory variables, and the bar 
on  0 p denotes that this variable is known. Note that ßx represents the expected net 
returns to conservation tillage and not the difference in returns between the two practices 
(represented by dy  above). 
  In this formulation, recovery of the standard deviation multiplier s  is 
straightforward as it will be simply the inverse of the coefficient estimated on  0 p . Thus, 
by adding information to the model in the form of the expected net profits from 
conventional tillage, it is possible to estimate the standard error, in turn allowing recovery 
of the specific parameter values for ß.
2   
  Further, it seems reasonable to assume that farmers fully understand the expected 
return for conventional tillage, as this practice has been used widely over a long period. 
Thus, farmers have substantial experience both in using conventional tillage and in 
predicting its mean profitability (e.g., in making annual planting decisions).  
  Turning now to the premium function, note that the theoretical basis for the presence 
of an adoption premium requires the presence of profit uncertainties of the two tillage 
practices. Although these uncertainties may affect the premium differently under risk 
aversion and real options, we focus on the magnitude of the premium and how it depends 
on the uncertainties rather than attempting to identify the source. Because the data set we 
use is cross-sectional and because agricultural input and output markets are well 
established, we see no reason why the farmers in our study region would face varying 
price uncertainty. Thus, only yield uncertainties vary across the sample and are modeled 
in this study. This observation provides important guidance in specifying the empirical 
model, as it implies that the adoption premiums should depend on variables related to 
yield uncertainty as well as farmer characteristics that may define how uncertainty 
translates into adoption premiums. 
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Data and Notation 
  The study region consists of the state of Iowa. The crops in the analysis are corn, 
soybeans, wheat, and hay. Summary statistics and definitions of the explanatory variables 
are given in Table 1. The variable  j I is an indicator function for crops: j=cn (corn), sb 
(soybeans), oth (other). That is,  j I =1 if a farmer grows crop j and j I = 0 otherwise. The 
primary data source is a random sample drawn from the National Resource Inventory 
(NRI) (USDA/SCS; Nusser and Goebel). For each NRI point, information is collected on 
the natural resource characteristics of the land, the farming practices used by the 
producer, and weather characteristics. To form our complete data set, we supplement the 
NRI data with constructed net returns, climate, and farm operator characteristics data. 
  All data are for the 1992 growing season. As seen from Table 1, 63 percent of 
farmers use conservation tillage. The expected net returns from conventional tillage ( 0 p ) 
are distinguished by crop in Table 1 and are those realized in 1992. Since returns data are 
not available from the NRI data, we assigned the net returns data to each sample point 
based on the production region and 1991 and 1992 crop information. To construct the 
regional returns data, we combined county-specific average yield data (USDA/NASS 
1994), state-specific price data (USDA/NASS 1999a), and the region-, tillage-, and 
rotation-specific cost data from Mitchell. The sample average net return to conventional 
tillage in corn production is about $145/acre, in soybeans, about $110/acre, and for all 
other crops, about $92/acre. A dummy variable indicating a crop other than corn or 
soybeans (“other crops”) is included to account for the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of 
these other choices (over 90 percent of Iowa is planted in corn or soybeans). 
  Climatic data (TMAX, TMIN, PRECIP, and  precip s ) were constructed from the 
1975-94 temperature and precipitation data collected by the National Climatic Data 
Center (Earthinfo) for the usual crop growing seasons as reported in USDA/NASS 
(1997). The standard deviation of precipitation  precip s  was calculated as the standard 
deviation of the daily precipitation during the growing season over the years 1975-94.  
  County average indicators of farm operator characteristics (OFFFARM, TENANT, 
AGE, and MALE) were constructed from the 1992 Census of Agriculture data (USDA/ 
NASS 1999b).
3 The remaining variables used in the model are indicators of land 8 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
 TABLE 1. Definition of variables and summary statistics 





Adopt  Conservation tillage (1-yes, 0-no)  Number  0.63  0.48 
cn I   Corn (1-corn, 0-soybeans or other 
crop) 
Number  0.57  0.50 
0,cn p   Net returns to conventional tillage, 
corn
a 
$ per acre  145  23 
0,sb p   Net returns to conventional tillage, 
soybeans
b 
$ per acre  109  14 




$ per acre  93  43 
SLOPE  Land slope  Percent  4.1  3.9 
PM  Soil permeability  Inches per Hour  1.7  2.2 
AWC  Soil available water capacity  Percent  18.5  2.8 
TMAX  Mean of daily maximum temperature 
during the corn growing season 
Fahrenheit  78.7  1.8 
TMIN  Mean of daily minimum temperature 
during the growing season 
Fahrenheit  55.6  2.0 
PRECIP  Mean of daily precipitation during the 
growing season 
Inches  0.141  0.012 
precip s   Standard deviation of daily 
precipitation during the growing 
season 
Inches  0.331  0.027 
OFFFARM  Proportion of operators working off-
farm to the total number of farm 
operators in the county 
Number  0.471  0.055 
TENANT  Proportion of harvested cropland 
operated by tenants to the total 
county harvested cropland 
Number  0.199  0.050 
AGE  County average farm operator age  Years  50.2  1.8 
MALE  Proportion of male operators to the 
total number of farm operators in 
the county 
Number  0.9774  0.0096 
Note: Total observations are 1,339. 
a 762 observations. 
b 475 observations. 
c Wheat, or hay. 
d 102 observations. 
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characteristics that are agronomically either favorable or unfavorable to conservation 
tillage practices. Because an increase in the amount of crop residue cover on the soil 
surface tends to keep soils cooler, wetter, less aerated, and denser (e.g., Allmaras and 
Dowdy), conservation tillage is favored on sloping and better-drained soils. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation Results 
  The probability of adopting conservation tillage practices for corn, soybeans, and 
other crops is specified as 












( ) 1,2,0,3,4,5,6, . jprecipjjjjjjj POFFFARMTENANTAGEMALE saapaaaa =+￿+￿+￿+￿+￿
 
The parameters to be estimated are the b ’s, the a ’s, and  e s . Table 2 presents the results 
of estimation. Estimates of the effect of soil and climatic conditions on the net returns to 
conservation tillage appear reasonable: land slope (the amount of inclination of the soil 
surface from the horizontal expressed as the vertical distance divided by the horizontal 
distance), soil permeability (the rate at which water can pass through a soil material), and 
available water capacity (the amount of water that a soil can store in a form available for 
plant use) are all positively related to better drainage of the soil. Improved soil drainage, 
in turn, is found to positively affect yields under conservation tillage systems (see, for 
example, Allmaras and Dowdy). Thus, the strong positive effects of these variables on 
conservation tillage adoption are consistent with agronomy and soil science. Our 
statistically significant positive relationship between the slope and the probability of 
adoption is likewise consistent with earlier studies by Rahm and Huffman, Norris and 
Batie, Wu and Babcock, and Uri. 
   10 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
TABLE 2. Maximum
 likelihood estimates of the adoption model 
Variable(s)  Parameter  Estimate  St. Error of Estimation
a 
Net returns to conservation tillage       
cn I   0,cn b   41  11
* 
SLOPE 
1 b   0.22  0.12
*** 
PM 
2 b   0.63  0.31
** 
AWC 
3 b   0.73  0.29
** 
TMAX 
4 b   2.57  0.68
* 
TMIN 
5 b   -2.48  0.72
* 
PRECIP 
6 b   76  69 
TENANT 
7 b   194  92
** 
 
e s   6.0  1.6
* 
Premium       
precipcn I s ￿   1,cn a   1400  411
* 
precipsb I s ￿   1,sb a   1123  432
* 
precipoth I s ￿   1,oth a   770  557 
0, precip cn sp ￿   2,cn a   -2.79  0.11
* 
0, precip sb sp ￿   2,sb a   -3.32  0.19
* 
0, precip oth sp ￿   2,oth a   -3.00  0.22
* 
precipcn OFFFARMI s ￿￿   3,cn a   -103  47
** 
precipsb OFFFARMI s ￿￿   3,sb a   -131  59
** 
precipoth OFFFARMI s ￿￿   3,oth a   -53  94 
precipcn TENANTI s ￿￿   4,cn a   607  274
** 
precipsb TENANTI s ￿￿   4,sb a   682  264
* 
precipoth TENANTI s ￿￿   4,oth a   442  339 
precipcn AGEI s ￿￿   5,cn a   -5.1  1.8
* 
precipsb AGEI s ￿￿   5,sb a   -4.0  2.0
** 
precipoth AGEI s ￿￿   5,oth a   -2.9  4.1 
precipcn MALEI s ￿￿   6,cn a   -763  302
** 
precipsb MALEI s ￿￿   6,sb a   -605  338
*** 
precipoth MALEI s ￿￿   6,oth a   -301  469 
Fraction of correct predictions    0.70   
Log (likelihood)    -779.3   
a The standard errors are computed from analytic second derivatives; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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  The effect of climatic variables on conservation tillage adoption is also consistent 
with agronomic science. With reduced tillage, the soils tend to stay cooler and wetter; 
thus, conservation tillage results in better yields in warmer regions. The strong positive 
effect of the average daily maximum temperature and the opposite one of the average 
daily minimum temperature agree with this expectation. The positive effect of 
precipitation is also consistent with rainfall generally acting as a limiting factor of crop 
production (Kaufmann and Snell; Hansen). 
  Several alternative model specifications were considered but were found to provide 
inferior fits. Specifically, we initially modeled the error term as heteroskedastic across 
crops, but the generalized likelihood ratio test failed to reject the hypothesis that the error 
term is homoskedastic (the computed test statistic, 3.72, does not exceed the critical value 
of 5.99 corresponding to the 5 percent level of significance). Initially, the intercept term, 
0 b , also was allowed to vary for every crop, but the estimates were not significant for 
soybeans and for other crops. 
  Notice that the variable TENANT can influence both the profitability of conservation 
tillage and the premium required. We also investigated other socioeconomic variables to 
explain the magnitude of the profitability, but their effect on the expected net returns to 
conservation tillage was not significant.
4  
Analysis of the Adoption Premium 
  Agronomic studies indicate that a major variable that affects yield uncertainties 
under both conservation and conventional tillage is the variability of climatic conditions 
during a crop’s growing season (Kaufmann and Snell; Hansen; Thompson). In this study, 
we model the climatic variability via variability of precipitation. While the variability of 
temperature is also important, it often affects the yield variability in conjunction with 
precipitation variability (Runge). Also, in our study region, areas with higher 
precipitation variability tend to have higher temperature variability during the crucial 
periods of the growing season; the sample correlation coefficients between precipitation 
variability and measures of temperature variability are as high as 0.25. Thus, only the 
precipitation variability is included in the premium estimation. The functional form 12 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
assumed for the adoption premium guarantees that there is zero premium without the 
weather variability, as theoretically required. 
  The size of the premium also is affected by the personal characteristics of the farmer, 
such as operator age, off-farm employment, tenancy, and gender. While this is not an 
exhaustive list, it encompasses most of the standard characteristics hypothesized to affect 
the adoption decision in the literature (Feder and Umali; Sunding and Zilberman).
5  
  Farmer’s age is found to negatively affect the adoption premium and thus to positively 
affect the adoption of conservation tillage. Previous studies have yielded mixed and 
inconclusive results on the effect of age and experience on adoption. Rahm and Huffman 
observed a positive though statistically insignificant association between human capital and 
adoption of conservation tillage for Iowa farmers growing corn in 1977. Fuglie found a 
positive effect of the years of farming experience on the adoption of reduced till in the Corn 
Belt in 1991-92. Uri used 1987 farm-level data and found no statistically significant effect 
of age on adoption of conservation tillage. Korsching et al. surveyed farmers in three 
central Iowa watersheds in 1980 and found that adopters were younger on average than 
were non-adopters. Norris and Batie found a statistically significant negative effect of age 
on conservation tillage acreage of cotton producers in Virginia. Featherstone and Goodwin 
found that older farmers invested less in conservation improvements. Finally, Soule, 
Tegene, and Wiebe found a statistically significant negative effect of age on the adoption of 
conservation tillage by corn producers. 
  These mixed results may be due to the possibility that age affects risk aversion and 
option values differently. In particular, risk aversion, and consequently risk premium, has 
been shown to rise with age (Bakshi and Chen; Palsson). The risk-aversion argument has 
often been supplied as an explanation for the estimated negative effect of age on the 
adoption of new, uncertain technologies (e.g., Dimara and Skuras). However, if age is 
positively related to accumulated knowledge and experience about the suitability of 
conventional and/or conservation till, a farmer of older age may have less incentive to 
gather further information. Thus, older farmers may demand a smaller option value 
compensation for their adoption. Our estimation results indicate that the option value 
effect of age does indeed dominate the risk-aversion effect. The Subsidy for Adopting Conservation Tillage: Estimation from Observed Behavior / 13 
  Off-farm employment is found to reduce the adoption premium, thereby increasing 
the adoption rate. Since those working off-farm have more diversified sources of income, 
they may be less risk averse and demand a smaller premium for adoption. This result is 
consistent with previous findings. Korsching et al. found a higher, though statistically 
insignificant, off-farm employment involvement by adopters of minimum tillage in Iowa 
in 1980. Fuglie, who analyzed a sample of midwestern farmers observed in 1991-92, also 
found a higher adoption of no-till by farmers working off-farm.  
  The consensus in the literature on the gender effect is that women are in general 
more risk averse than men (e.g., Jianakoplos and Bernasek; Barsky et al.). Thus, one 
would expect the risk premium to be smaller for men than for women. Our estimates 
suggest a negative effect of the proportion of males on the adoption premium. This result 
is consistent with the higher rate of adoption of soil conservation structures by male 
operators estimated by Young and Shortle. 
  We find that tenancy increases the expected net returns to conservation tillage but also 
raises the adoption premium. Its overall effect on adoption is negligible, as these two 
effects roughly cancel each other out. The positive effect of tenancy on profitability may be 
explained by a very strong profit-maximizing motivation among tenants. In particular, 
tenancy leaves no room for recreational farming. However, renters may have a shorter 
planning horizon (possibly due to tenure insecurity) and a greater risk-aversion coefficient, 
leading to a higher risk premium. To the extent that tenants may have less historical 
knowledge of the land parcel compared to owners (Surjandari and Batte), they may also 
have a higher option value. In addition, because of tenure insecurity, a renter may have 
little incentive to maintain soil fertility or control erosion, or to enjoy the positive long-run 
effects of conservation tillage. All these factors imply a higher adoption premium. Further, 
tenants may be prohibited from adopting conservation practices because absentee 
landowners are not willing to make any changes in the way land is operated.  
  The empirical literature on the effects of tenancy has been mixed (see, for example, 
Fuglie and the discussion in Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe). Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe point 
out that lease arrangements may influence renters’ conservation decisions. They also find 
that, while cash-renters are less likely, share-renters are not less likely than owner-
operators to use conservation tillage. Share-renters, they explain, may behave more like 14 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
owner-operators than cash-renters because they bear only a share of the costs, and 
landlords tend to participate more actively in the management of farms rented under 
share leases. Our estimates suggest yet another explanation for the mixed effects of 
tenancy: the relative dominance of either the effect of payoff or of the premium.  
  We used returns to conventional tillage as a proxy to farmer’s income in the analysis 
of the premium. This variable does not account for either accumulated wealth or total 
farmer’s income, yet it gives a good indication of the income from farming activity. The 
estimated strong negative effect of this variable on the premium is consistent with the 
presumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion that has found support in many studies 
of farmers’ behavior (Moschini and Hennessy). However, similar to the effect of tenancy, 
the overall effect of this variable on the probability of adoption is about zero at the data 
means.
6 This finding is in agreement with the common absence of income variables in 
conservation tillage adoption models and with the inconclusive findings on the effect of 
income on the adoption of erosion-control practices (Young and Shortle; Norris and 
Batie; Belknap and Saupe; Uri). 
  Finally, the top part of Table 3 presents the estimated adoption premiums for the 
entire sample. The premium accounts for about 17 percent of the annual returns to 
conventional tillage for corn and soybeans. 
 
Adoption Subsidies and Policy Implications 
  Based on the estimated results, we can calculate the subsidies that are needed to 
induce farmers to adopt conservation tillage. Given the farmer, soil, and weather 
characteristics, we calculate the expected net return from conservation tillage,  1 ˆ p , and the 
required adoption premium,  ˆ P. Let S be the minimum subsidy required for a farmer to 
adopt conservation tillage. If a farmer has already adopted conservation tillage, the 
required subsidy is zero. Otherwise, the minimum subsidy must satisfy  10 ˆ ˆ SP pp +=+ . 
Then we know 
  ( ) { } 01 ˆ ˆ max,0. SP pp =+-   (4) 
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TABLE 3. Estimated adoption premium 
Variable  Corn  Soybeans  Other Crops
 
Whole sample
       









Expected net returns to conservation tillage, 











Percentage of the premium in the expected net 









Expected net returns to conventional tillage, 
0 p  ($) 
a 
145.1  108.6  93.0 
Predicted subsidies for adoption for current non-
adopters
 b 
     







Premium,  ˆ P ($)








Subsidy needed for adoption, 














*** indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The standard errors are 
computed using the Delta method under the assumption of asymptotic normality. We used the subroutine 
ANALYZE of TSP to compute the standard errors. 
a Sample means. 
b144 observations for corn, 68 observations for soybeans, and 80 observations for other crops. 
 
When S is positive, it can be decomposed into two parts. One part (equal to ˆ P) is used to 
remove the “hesitancy” of farmers by compensating for their adoption premium, and the 
remaining part is the monetary transfer to compensate for the profit loss.  
  The second half of Table 3 presents estimates of the mean premium and mean subsidy 
for the subsample of farmers who have not adopted conservation tillage and therefore are 
not predicted to adopt without any government subsidy. In general, consistent with the 
extensive agronomic studies, the expected profit of conservation tillage is higher than that 
of conventional tillage. For example, the predicted average profit gain of conservation 
tillage is $10.60 per acre for corn and $34.80 per acre for soybeans. Then what is the reason 
that these farmers have not adopted conservation tillage in spite of the profit gains? The 16 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
answer lies with the adoption premium. The average premium is $13.10 per acre for corn 
and $38.40 for soybeans, both of which are higher than the profit gain from conservation 
tillage. Therefore, either because of risk aversion or real options, these farmers stayed with 
conventional tillage. That is, the potential gain was not high enough to offset the presence 
of risk aversion and/or real options. 
  To induce adoption, the mean subsidy, which equals the difference between the 
mean profit gain and the adoption premium, is $2.35 per acre per year for corn and $3.50 
for soybeans. The median subsidies are lower for both crops. That is, these subsidies will 
induce more than half of the current non-adopters to switch to conservation tillage. Our 
estimate of the required subsidies is much lower than that of Cooper, who estimated the 
median subsidy to be about $23. Our lower estimate seems reasonable in our study 
application given that, without any subsidies, about 64 percent of farmers have adopted 
conservation tillage for corn and 68 percent have adopted for soybeans. 
  Applying equation (4) to each sample point, we calculate the required minimum 
adoption subsidies for the entire sample. Extrapolating our sample to the state as a whole, 
we obtain the state’s intensity of adoption at each subsidy level, or the “supply curve” of 
conservation tillage, presented in Figure 1. Over 14 million acres (about 63 percent of all 
agricultural land in Iowa) are already in conservation tillage without any subsidy. The 
acreage increases as the subsidy level rises. At a subsidy of $11.50 per acre, about 90 
percent of farmland would be in conservation tillage. 
  The supply curve allows us to analyze the nature of a conservation tillage subsidy, in 
particular, its role as a tool for environmental efficiency or for income transfer. Suppose 
the government decides to subsidize conservation tillage at $11.50 per acre, for new and 
existing adopters alike.
7 The subsidy acts as a pure income transfer for existing adopters, 
for they do not need any additional incentive to adopt. Even for the new adopters, part of 
the subsidy is in fact an income transfer (similar to producer surplus) due to the 
heterogeneity of the adoption costs. Only the area under the supply curve captures the 
required compensation for conservation tillage or serves the single purpose of generating 
environmental benefits from conservation tillage. From Figure 1, it is obvious that the 
income transfer portion of the subsidy far exceeds the efficiency payment component. Of 
the $236 million total subsidy needed to achieve 90 percent adoption, about $204 million, The Subsidy for Adopting Conservation Tillage: Estimation from Observed Behavior / 17 
 
FIGURE 1. Total predicted cost of the subsidy to achieve 90 percent adoption in Iowa 
 
or over 86 percent of the total subsidies, comprises income transfers, a major part of 
which goes to existing adopters. Of course, the income transfer will be less important in 
states where the existing adoption is low and the adoption costs are less heterogeneous. 
  Further, by relating the required subsidy to farmer characteristics, we can analyze 
how the level and structure of the subsidy varies by farmer groups. For example, Table 1 
and the discussion in the previous section on the adoption premium indicate that the 
required subsidy decreases in off-farm employment. Thus, a low level of subsidy is likely 
to attract farmers with off-farm employment to adopt conservation tillage. As the subsidy 
rises, farmers without off-farm employment will increasingly adopt. 
 
Conclusions 
  We propose a method of directly estimating the financial incentives for adopting 
conservation tillage and distinguishing between the expected payoff and premium of 
adoption based on observed behavior. We find that the adoption premium may play a 
significant role in farmers’ adoption decisions (accounting for about 17 percent of their 
annual profits on average). Non-adopters do not use conservation tillage because the 18 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
expected profit gain alone does not fully compensate them for the increased risk and 
possibility of irreversible lost profits associated with conventional tillage practices. To 
induce adoption, government subsidies are needed to overcome the adoption premium net 
of the expected gain from adoption. We find that on average the mean subsidy needed is 
$2.4 per acre per year for corn and $3.5 per acre per year for soybeans. 
  Farmer characteristics can affect the adoption decision either by influencing the 
expected payoff of adoption or by changing the adoption premium. The two effects may 
work in opposition. For example, we find that while tenancy in general increases the 
expected profitability of adoption, it also raises the premium. The two effects roughly 
cancel each other out so that, in aggregate, tenancy does not change the adoption rate 
significantly. Given that the subsidies needed are mainly used to overcome the adoption 
premium, identifying the different effects of these characteristics is important for policy 
design and for evaluating impacts of the subsidies across geographic and socioeco-
nomic groups. 
  In this study, we do not distinguish between the forces of risk aversion and real 
options underlying the adoption premium. However, the distinction is important for 
policy design because the two possibilities may suggest different optimal policy 
responses. For example, if it is risk aversion that generates the bulk of the premium, a 
proper government response may be to offer stabilization policies such as green 
insurance. However, if it is irreversibility of sunk investments that primarily generates the 
premium, measures to reduce the option value are more efficient, such as providing better 
information about conservation tillage or reducing the sunk cost of adoption (e.g., by 






  In an alternative approach, Caswell and Zilberman estimate the premium for adopting new irrigation 
technologies by relating the costs of technologies to well depth and electricity rates. 
 
2.  Readers familiar with the contingent valuation literature immediately will see the similarity between 
this model and the Cameron bid function approach commonly used to estimate the willingness to pay 
for an environmental quality change from discrete choice data. In the contingent valuation models, the 
bid offered to respondents in the survey varies across respondents in the same way that the expected net 
returns from conventional tillage will vary across a sample of farmers. It is this variability that allows 
identification of the variance of the error in both types of application.  
 
3.   The AGE variable turned out to be highly correlated with another variable available in the Census of 
Agriculture, PRESENCE, the average years present on the farm (coefficient of correlation 0.67 with a 
p-value of less than 0.0001). The model estimated with the PRESENCE variable is neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively different from the one presented here. Therefore, only AGE is included 
in our model. 
 
4.  Specifically, we compared three models: (i) the completely unrestricted model where the explanatory 
variables OFFFARM, AGE, and MALE appear on both the payoff side (the b’s) and on the premium 
side (the a’s); (ii) the restricted model in which the explanatory variables OFFFARM, AGE, and MALE 
appear on the payoff side only; and (iii) the restricted model as presented, in which the explanatory 
variables OFFFARM, AGE, and MALE appear on the premium side only. Using the generalized 
likelihood ratio tests, we reject model (ii) in favor of model (i) (the computed test statistic 28.2 is greater 
than the critical value of 16.92 corresponding to the 5 percent level of significance) and fail to reject 
model (iii) in favor of model (i) (the computed test statistic 1.13 is clearly less than the critical values at 
any conventional level of significance). Full model and test results are available from the authors. 
 
5.  We do not include farm size and farmer’s education, two factors sometimes considered as affecting the 
adoption decisions, because of lack of data. 
 
6.  The derivative of the probability of adoption with respect to  0 p  is proportional to 
2,2,2, 1() precipcncnsbsbothoth III saaa +￿￿+￿+￿ . 
 
7.  The government may choose to subsidize new adopters only, but the feasibility of such a policy is 
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